Anna Ella
Carroll’s Role in the 1862 Tennessee River
Campaign
by
James F. Epperson
September, 2026
Miss Carroll
was born and raised
in a prominent Maryland Eastern Shore political family; her father was
a
Governor of the state in the early 1830s, and her great-grandfather was
Charles
Carrol of Carrolton, Secretary to the Second Continental Congress and a
signer
of the Declaration of Independence. She
did write a number of pamphlets on presidential war powers (which have
led some
to give her credit for inspiring the Emancipation Proclamation; we take
no
position on that claim here.). Our interest
here, however, is in
her claim to have come up with the plan to use the Tennessee and
Cumberland
Rivers, instead of the Mississippi River, as avenues of invasion of the
Confederacy—in essence then, to have authored the Fort Henry-Fort
Donelson
Campaign. This claim is founded upon a
meeting which Carroll had with Charles Scott, a riverboat pilot, during
a trip
she took west in the fall of 1861, followed by a November 30 interview
with
Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott.
It has largely (and effectively) been answered by Kenneth
P. Williams,
in [KPW]. Here we will outline the basis
for the claim, largely from [AEC] and [C], then discuss the refutation,
with
direct references to the material used in [KPW]. The article [L] is also useful in understanding this controversy. The notion that the Mississippi River would be used as a major avenue of invasion of the Confederacy is based on Gen. Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan,” first outlined in a May 3, 1861, letter to Maj. Gen. George McClellan, then serving as Ohio’s commander of militia [OR1]. The crux of Anna Ella Carroll’s claim is that her interview with Charles Scott indicated a number of reasons to prefer the Tennessee or Cumberland Rivers, and she claimed to have conveyed this information to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott in November of 1861. However, as Prof. Williams points out [KPW], due to the seizure of Paducah, Kentucky on Sept. 6, 1861, by troops under the overall command of Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, it appears that the Tennessee was being considered as an invasion route two months before Carroll’s meeting with Thomas Scott. Shortly thereafter (Oct. 12, 1861), the U.S.S. Conestoga, a “timberclad” gunboat under the command of Lt. Seth Ledyard Phelps, made a reconnaissance of Fort Henry, situated on the Tennessee River [ORN]. Williams asserts that these actions indicated a movement away from the Mississippi as the preferred avenue of invasion. In
addition, on November 20, 1861---10 days before Carroll's interview
with Scott---Col. Charles Whittlesey, serving as an Engineering Officer
in Cincinnati, wrote to Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, commanding the
Department of the Missouri, about using the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers as avenues of invasion into the Confederacy [OR4].
According to E.B. Long, writing in [L], as early as September 5, 1861,
Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, commanding the Department of the West (which
became the Department of the Missouri when Fremont was replaced by
Halleck in November), was considering a thrust up the Tennessee and
Cumberland Rivers, in order "to enter the states of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi." At about the same time,
Col. (later, Major General) Lew Wallace, as he recalled when writing
his Autobiography [L, WA],
had a meeting with his immediate superior, Brig. Gen. C.F. Smith, in
which Smith pointed out the Tennessee and Cumberland as fruitful
avenues of advance. The
big problem for Carroll's clains is that everyone had maps, and those
with military training---or even a decent amount of common sense---could see that the Tennessee and Cumberland were
like a pair of daggers aimed at the Confederacy's vitals [L]. However, it is
entirely likely
that Carroll’s meeting with Thomas Scott was the means by which
the
Tennessee/Cumberland route of invasion was conveyed to President
Lincoln. Carroll’s error, in her postwar
efforts to
seek compensation for her efforts, seems to lie in assuming that
Grant’s February
strike up the Tennessee and Cumberland was directed from Washington. The record is very clear that the impetus
came from Grant and Foote [OR2], and the
authorization
came from Halleck [OR3].
Carroll appears to have assumed that the fact that the
advance followed
the course she had suggested to Ass’t Sec’y of War Thomas Scott meant
that
Lincoln had ordered it, thus the credit was hers. In fact, he had
not; the attack was conceived by Foote and Grant, then ordered by
Halleck. Miss Carroll
might well deserve
credit for much that supported the Lincoln Administration in 1861—62. The advance along the Tennessee and
Cumberland Rivers is not any part of that.
Bibliography [AEC] Anna Ella
Carroll, “Plan of
the Tennessee Campaign,” North American Review, vol. 142, no.
353, 1886,
pp. 342—347. [C] Janet L.
Coryell, “Anna Ella
Carroll and the Historians,” Civil War History, vol. 35, no. 2,
1989,
pp. 120—137. [CS] Charles M.
Scott, The
Origins of the Tennessee Campaign, Terre Haute, 1889. [KPW] Kenneth P. Williams, “The Tennessee River Campaign and Anna Ella Carroll,” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 46, no. 3, 1950, pp. 221—248. [L] E.B. Long, "Anna Ella Carroll, Exaggerated Heroine?", Civil War Times Illustrated, July, 1975. [OR1] Official
Records, Series
1, Vol. LI, Part 1, pp. 369—370. [ORN] Official Records (Navies), Series 1, Vol. XXII, p. 371. [WA] Lew Wallace, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 340. |
Back to Chronology of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson-Shiloh Campaign Sources: See Bibliography, above. Date added to website: Sept. 29, 2026. |